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Abstract 
A framework is developed for examining the price and welfare effects of the 
introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops. In the short run, non-GM grain 
generally becomes another niche product. However, more profound market effects are 
observed under some reasonable parameterizations. In the long run, consumer and 
producer welfare are usually greater after the introduction of GM technology. 
Nevertheless, in all instances some consumers and some producers lose. When identity 
preservation is expensive and cost savings are relatively small, both producer and 
consumer welfare are lower after introducing GM technology. Interestingly, this outcome 
is obtained even though all agents are individually rational. 
 
Key words: asymmetric demand, consumer response, genetically modified (GM) crops, 
market response, non-GM crops, price signals, welfare analysis. 
  
 
RESPONSE TO AN ASYMMETRIC DEMAND FOR  
ATTRIBUTES: AN APPLICATION TO THE MARKET FOR 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 
The rapid adoption of genetically modified (GM) crop varieties by farmers in the 
United States, Canada, and Argentina in the late 1990s created an interest among some 
consumers in having continued access to non-modified varieties. This consumer response 
appears to have been strongest in the European Union (EU), but it created a worldwide 
reaction against GM grain among companies that process food for direct human 
consumption. The consumer response also created concern among firms that process 
grain for animal feed. The first example of a restriction on GM grain for animal feed 
occurred in South Korea in March of 2001. The EU has also begun consideration of an 
animal feed directive. The possibility that the EU might restrict imports of GM grain 
products in turn caused some U.S. grain processors to request non-GM grain. The 
apparent motivation for grain processors is to maintain access to the EU market for corn 
gluten, a valuable by-product of both the fuel and corn sugar industries. These trade and 
commercial developments are reviewed by Carlson, Marra, and Hubbell (1997); James 
(1997, 1998, 2000); Hubbell, Marra, and Carlson (2000); Lin, Chambers, and Harwood 
(2000); Ballenger, Bohman, and Gehlar (2000); and McCluskey (2000). 
The market response to these developments will depend on the relative size of the 
supply and demand for GM and non-GM varieties. One interesting feature of the market is 
the asymmetry with which customers will respond to market conditions. If the non-GM 
output share exceeds the corresponding demand share, then there will be a relative surplus 
of non-GM crops. This means that a consumer who is indifferent between GM and non-
GM crops will end up consuming some non-GM grain. Because this consumer will not be 
willing to pay a premium for non-GM grain, some non-GM grain will be sold at the same 
price as GM grain. The rest of the non-GM output will be sold at a premium that pays for 
the additional handling charges, much as occurs in existing niche markets. 
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If the non-GM output share is smaller than the respective demand share, then a 
consumer who would have preferred non-GM grain will end up purchasing GM grain. 
For this to occur, all GM grain would have to be discounted to make the marginal 
consumer indifferent about buying GM or non-GM grain. One additional complicating 
factor is that output and demand uncertainty at the beginning of any crop year makes it 
difficult to predict production and demand shares. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the equilibrium conditions for markets with 
both types of grain. We provide both an algebraic form of these conditions and a 
simplified version in graphical form. We then use these conditions and a set of reasonable 
parameters to describe the conditions under which premiums and discounts will emerge 
and to explain how the sizes of these differences are related to the causal factors. The first 
scenario assumes that supply is fixed and is useful for examining market response within 
a one-year period. The second scenario allows supplies to adjust to price signals. 
The general framework presented here is directly applicable to other markets, such as 
tropical woods, tuna, pork, prison products, and diamonds, where some consumers are 
willing to pay premiums for certificates indicating that environmental, animal welfare, 
labor, and humanitarian standards were met in the production process. However, the 
parameters chosen for the simulations are specific to the U.S. corn market. 
 
Scenario I:  Fixed Supply 
Immediately after harvest, the amount of GM and non-GM grain available for 
consumption during the year is fixed. Suppose that maintaining the identity of non-GM 
grain costs C per bushel, which creates a wedge between the price paid by consumers for 
identified non-GM grain ( DnoP ) and the price received by producers for non-GM grain 
sold as such ( SnoP ). Without identification, non-GM grain can be traded only as GM grain 
at the GM price PGM (PGM £ SnoP  = 
D
noP  - C), which is the same for both producers and 
consumers. 
Total grain demand is an aggregation of individual demands from heterogeneous 
consumers. More specifically, consumers of type d (0 £ d £ 1) will substitute GM grain 
for non-GM grain as long as the price paid for the former (PGM) is less than or equal to a 
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fraction d of the price paid for the latter ( DnoP ). That is, d is a discount factor that agents 
of type d apply to GM grain relative to non-GM grain. For example, agents with d = 0.85 
will buy GM grain instead of non-GM grain only if they pay no more than 85 percent of 
the non-GM price for the former. 
Aggregate total grain demand (whether GM or non-GM) by d-type consumers is 
represented by 
 Dd = dd(Pd), (1) 
where Pd º DnoP  if PGM ³ d 
D
noP , and Pd º d
-1 PGM if PGM < d DnoP . Demand function dd(×) 
is assumed to satisfy standard regularity conditions (e.g., ¶dd/¶Pd < 0). Given equation 
(1), the demand schedules for GM grain and non-GM grain by d-type consumers are 
equations (2) and (3), respectively:1 
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From these expressions, it is clear that d-type agents will consume a total amount of grain 
(GM plus non-GM) equal to dd( DnoP ) = dd(d
-1 PGM) when PGM = d DnoP . However, in this 
instance they are indifferent about how much of that quantity is GM grain as opposed to 
non-GM grain. Hence, the specific amounts of GM and non-GM grain consumed by d-
type agents cannot be determined uniquely without information about supply. 
Given fixed supplies of GM grain ( GMS ) and non-GM grain ( noS ), the market-
clearing conditions consist of equations (4) and (5):2 
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 GMS  = GMD *d  + )(
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D
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where d* º ** / DnoGM PP  £ 1 - 
*/ DnoPC  is the market-clearing consumer discount for GM 
grain.3 Equations (4) and (5) can be used to solve for the market-clearing prices *GMP  and 
*D
noP , and the equilibrium producer price is obtained as 
*S
noP  = 
*D
noP  - C. In equilibrium, 
consumers with a discount factor strictly less (greater) than d* will only consume non-
GM (GM) grain. Consumers of type d* will be indifferent about consumption of either 
kind of grain, so they will consume the amounts that balance the corresponding supplies. 
For the purpose of performing welfare analysis, it is important to note that the area 
below dd(×) in equation (1) can be used to measure the impact on the consumer surplus of 
d-type agents due to changes in prices PGM, DnoP , or both simultaneously (i.e., price 
changes that may affect Pd). Although, in general, consumer surplus changes do not 
provide an exact measure of the welfare changes experienced by a consumer, the former 
measure the latter exactly when the consumer’s utility is quasilinear (Varian 1992, p. 
163). Further, aggregate consumer surplus is an exact measure of aggregate consumer 
welfare for quasilinear utilities (Varian 1992, p. 169). For these reasons, we will employ 
quasilinear utilities as needed when addressing consumer welfare issues. 
A Graphical Analysis with Two Polar Types of Consumers 
It is helpful to analyze graphically a simplified version of the model. Consider the 
extreme case of only two consumer types; namely, consumers who are unwilling to 
consume GM grain at any price (i.e., d = 0) and consumers who are completely 
indifferent about GM and non-GM grain (i.e., d = 1). Assume further that their total 
demands for grain are given by D0 = d( DnoP ), and by 
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respectively. That is, the two types of consumers have the same d(×) function.4 To avoid 
cluttering the graphs, assume zero identification costs (i.e., C = 0), so that DnoP  = 
S
noP  = Pno. 
Demand for GM grain by consumers of type d = 0 is zero (D0GM = 0). Figure 1 depicts 
demand for GM grain from consumers of type d = 1 (D1GM), along with a hypothetical 
fixed supply of GM grain (SGM). When prices of non-GM grain are high (Pno ³ P), all of 
the consumption by type-1 agents consists of GM grain only. The solid line in Figure 1 
gives their demand schedule. For example, for the GM supply level shown, D1 = D1GM = 
SGM and the corresponding price for GM grain is PGM = P < Pno (³ P). But for lower 
prices of non-GM grain, say, Pno = P, the quantity of GM grain demanded at prices above 
PGM = P is zero, so that the dashed line depicts the GM demand schedule. Given a GM 
supply of SGM, the GM price is PGM = P = Pno (i.e., there is no discount for GM grain), 
and total grain consumption by type-1 agents equals Q, of which SGM consists of GM 
grain and the remainder (Q - SGM) is non-GM grain. 
The consumer surplus of type-1 agents (i.e., the area below d1(×) in (1)) can also be 
read in Figure 1. To see this, note that total grain demand by type-1 consumers (1) is the 
same as their demand for GM grain when Pno ³ P (i.e., D1 = D1GM given Pno ³ P). Hence, 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Demand for genetically modified grain by consumers of type 1 (D1GM) 
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the area under the curve D1GM for Pno ³ P measures the consumer surplus of type-1 
agents.5 For example, type-1 consumers’ surplus when P1 = P is given by the triangle 
PAP. Similarly, area PABP measures the change in type-1 consumers’ surplus due to a 
change in P1 from P to P. 
In equilibrium, either there is some discounting (d* º ** / noGM PP  < 1) or there is no 
discounting whatsoever (d* º ** / noGM PP  = 1). Consider the discounting equilibrium first. 
If d* < 1, market equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) become (7) and (8), respectively: 
 SGM = d1( *GMP ), (7) 
 Sno = d0( *noP ), (8) 
where *GMP  < *noP . Figure 2 illustrates this market equilibrium. The distance between the 
two vertical axes is equal to the total grain supply, SGM + Sno. The left-hand-side vertical 
axis measures GM prices, against which demand for GM grain by type-1 consumers is 
shown. Analogously, the right-hand-side axis measures non-GM prices, and demand for 
non-GM grain by type-0 consumers is depicted against it.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Market equilibrium with a large, fixed supply of genetically modified 
grain relative to non-genetically modified grain 
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 The equilibrium displayed in Figure 2 is characterized by a large supply of GM grain 
relative to the non-GM supply. Because relative GM supplies are large and only type-1 
agents are willing to consume such grain, the equilibrium GM price ( *GMP ) must be low 
to clear the market as required by equation (7). In equilibrium, the discount for GM grain 
arises because if such a discount did not exist (i.e., Pno = *GMP ), demand for non-GM 
grain by type-0 consumers would exceed the supply of non-GM grain (i.e., d0(Pno = 
*
GMP ) > Sno) and would fail to meet equilibrium condition (8). The latter condition is met 
only if the discount factor equals d* º ** / noGM PP  < 1. In equilibrium, the consumer surplus 
of type-1 agents is depicted by the triangle *GMABP , whereas the consumer surplus of 
type-2 agents is given by the smaller triangle *noEFP . 
In the no-discount equilibrium (d* º ** / noGM PP  = 1), market equilibrium conditions 
(4) and (5) turn out to be conditions (9) and (10), respectively: 
 SGM = d1(P*) - D1no, (9) 
 Sno = D1no + d0(P*), (10) 
where P* = *GMP  = *noP . Figure 3 illustrates this scenario, which differs from the situation 
shown in Figure 2 only in that the fixed supply of non-GM grain is large relative to the 
fixed supply of GM grain. In particular, total grain supply is identical in both figures. 
The relatively plentiful non-GM supply illustrated in Figure 3 implies that, even at a 
low non-GM price such as *noP , there is non-GM grain left over by type-0 agents that has 
to be absorbed by type-1 consumers (Sno - d0(P*) > 0). But because type-1 agents are not 
willing to pay any premium for such grain, in equilibrium the non-GM price cannot 
exceed the GM price (i.e., *noP  = *GMP  = P
*). Hence, no GM discount is observed in 
equilibrium (i.e., d* º ** / noGM PP  = 1). Type-1 agents consume all of the GM supply (D1GM 
= SGM) plus the fraction of non-GM supply not consumed by type-0 agents (D1no = (Sno - 
d0(P*)). In equilibrium, the consumer surpluses of type-0 agents and type-1 agents are 
represented by triangles *GMABP  and 
*
noBFP , respectively.  
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FIGURE 3. Market equilibrium with a small, fixed supply of genetically modified 
grain relative to non-genetically modified grain 
 
 In summary, assuming fixed supply and polar consumer types, the GM discount in 
equilibrium behaves in an intuitive fashion. Discounts for GM grain are observed when 
non-GM supply is small relative to GM supply. The GM discount falls as the supply 
share of non-GM increases and eventually becomes zero for sufficiently large non-GM 
supply shares. Analysis of Figures 2 and 3 also reveals that, for given fixed supplies of 
GM and non-GM grain, the GM discount will either increase or remain unchanged at 
zero if demand from type-0 consumers increases and/or if demand from type-1 
consumers decreases. In contrast, the response of the GM discount to an increase in total 
grain supply holding constant the GM share is ambiguous, as it depends on the specific 
shapes of the demand functions of type-0 and type-1 consumers. 
The consumer surplus of type-0 (type-1) agents increases (decreases) as the relative 
non-GM supply increases, up to the point where the relative supply of non-GM grain is 
so large that in equilibrium some of the latter is acquired by type-1 agents. Beyond that 
point, additions to the share of non-GM supplies do not affect the consumer surplus of 
either type-0 agents or type-1 agents. In general, increasing the relative supply of GM 
grain versus non-GM grain may increase or decrease total consumer surplus (i.e., the sum 
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of type-0 and type-1 consumer surpluses), depending on the specific characteristics of 
type-0 and type-1 demand schedules. 
We can analyze the situation under identification costs, as was done previously, but 
this time we use a derived demand instead of the original demand for type-0 consumers. 
In Figures 2 and 3, the derived demand would appear below the original demand curve 
D0no, at a vertical distance equal to the identification cost. The most interesting result 
from such an analysis is that in the Figure 3 scenario, only part of the non-GM grain is 
identified in equilibrium. The reason for this is that in such a scenario, some of the non-
GM grain is acquired by type-1 consumers, who do not care about whether the grain is 
GM or not. Therefore, type-1 consumers pay *GMP  to buy GM grain as well as 
unidentified non-GM grain. Type-0 consumers buy only identified non-GM grain at a 
price of *DnoP  = 
*
GMP  + C, and suppliers receive *GMP  for all of the grain sold, regardless 
of whether the latter is GM or not. 
 
Scenario II:  Flexible Supply 
We analyze the more realistic scenario with flexible supply by modeling a produc-
tion sector in a manner analogous to the demand framework already discussed. In 
particular, we assume that producers of type s (0 < s £ 1) can produce GM grain at a 
fraction s of the cost of producing non-GM grain.6 That is, type-s producers will prefer 
to plant a GM crop instead of a non-GM crop if PGM > s SnoP , and vice versa. Aggregate 
total (i.e., GM plus non-GM) grain supply by type-s producers is denoted by 
 Ss = ss(Ps), (11) 
where Ps º SnoP  if PGM £ s 
S
noP , and Ps º s
-1 PGM if PGM > s SnoP . We also assume that 
supply function ss(×) is well behaved (e.g., ¶ss/¶Ps > 0). Based on equation (11), the 
supply schedules for GM grain and non-GM grain corresponding to s-type producers are 
equations (12) and (13), respectively:  
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A Graphical Example 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 shows the total supply schedules (11) by firms of 
types s = 1 and s = s < 1. To facilitate the discussion, Figure 4 is drawn assuming that 
the total supply functions are identical for the two kinds of firms (i.e., s1(×) = ss(×) = s(×)).7 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Total supply of grain by producers of types s = 1 (S1) and s = s < 1 (Ss) 
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For example, consider the scenario where SnoP  = P* and PGM = P, such that P < P* < s
-1 
P. In this instance, type-1 firms have P1 = P* and produce a total amount equal to s(P*), 
all of which is non-GM grain (i.e., S1 = S1no = s(P*) and S1GM = 0). In contrast, type-s 
firms have Ps = s-1 P > P* and produce a total amount s(s-1 P) > s(P*), of which all 
consists of GM grain (i.e., Ss = SsGM = s(s-1 P) and Ssno = 0). The producer surplus of 
type-1 firms is given by the triangle P*BP, whereas type-s producer surplus is the larger 
triangle s-1PAP. It follows that a reduction in the cost of producing GM crops from s = 1 
to s = s while maintaining SnoP  and PGM constant at P* and P, respectively, increases 
producer surplus by the trapezoid s-1PABP*. 
Starting from PGM = P, a ceteris paribus GM price decrease leaves type-1 producers 
unaffected, as it was unprofitable for them to grow GM crops to begin with. However, 
such a price decrease will induce a reduction in the (GM) output of type-s firms, as long 
as PGM > s P*. At PGM = s P*, type-s producers switch to non-GM crops. For larger GM 
price reductions (i.e., PGM < s P*), type-s firms produce s(P*) of non-GM and none of 
the GM crops, regardless of how much PGM drops below s P*. 
Because of their lower cost of growing GM crops, type-s firms have a clear 
advantage over type-1 producers. This may be better appreciated by considering the 
situation where SnoP  < P and PGM = P. In this instance, it is unprofitable for type-1 firms 
to plant either GM or non-GM crops, whereas type-s firms supply the amount s(s-1 P) of 
GM grain. 
Market Equilibrium with Flexible Supply 
In the presence of flexible supplies (12) and (13), the market-clearing conditions 
analogous to (4) and (5) are (14) and (15), respectively:8 
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These two equations plus the non-GM price equation *DnoP  = 
*S
noP  + C (and the definitions 
of d* and s*) provide the required information to solve for the three unknown equilibrium 
prices *SnoP , 
*D
noP , and 
*
GMP . In equilibrium, only those producers with a relative 
advantage at growing GM crops will supply GM grain. Such producers are characterized 
by s < ** / SnoGM PP  = s
*. Firms with s > ** / SnoGM PP  = s
* will only supply non-GM grain, 
as their cost savings from planting GM crops are not enough to offset the price 
differential in favor of non-GM grain. 
Welfare Analysis 
Total welfare effects (DW) are measured as the sum of the total change in producers’ 
surplus (DPS) and the total change in consumers’ surplus (DCS). To illustrate, suppose 
that we want to quantify the impact on producers’ surplus caused by a technological 
innovation (e.g., a reduction in the cost of producing GM grain across all firms). Because 
the innovation induces a change in supply schedules, let )(0 ×ss  and )(1 ×ss  be the supply 
functions for the initial and final set of type-s producers, respectively. Then, 
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where 0sP  ( 1sP ) denotes the type-s  price corresponding to the initial (final) equilibrium 
prices 0SnoP  and 
0
GMP  (
1S
noP  and 
1
GMP ), 
0
sB  (
1
sB ) is the lower bound for the domain of 
)(0 ×ss  ( )(1 ×ss ), and x is an integration dummy. The first and second terms within brackets 
denote the final and initial total producers’ surpluses, respectively. Total producers’ 
surpluses are obtained by adding up across all types of firms their corresponding 
surpluses, which are represented by the integrals. 
In a similar manner, total change in consumers’ surplus (DCS) is calculated as follows: 
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where 
0
dB  (
1
dB ) is the upper bound for the domain of )(0 ×dd  ( )(1 ×dd ), and the remaining 
notation is analogous to the notation used in equation (16). In the special situation where 
all of the demand schedules remain unchanged (i.e., )(0 ×dd  = )(1 ×dd  = dd(×) for all d), as 
would be the case for the technological innovation example, equation (17) simplifies to 
DCS = å ò
d
d
d
d
0
1
 )(
P
P
dxxd . 
Model Calibration 
To perform quantitative analysis, we must specify demand and supply functions (1) 
and (11), respectively. For this purpose, we adopt the following isoelastic demand 
schedule: 
 dd(Pd) = kD(d) ded
-P , (18) 
where kD(d) denotes a demand scaling function, and ed is the constant demand elasticity 
corresponding to type-d consumers. Scaling function kD(d) is the aggregate amount 
demanded by type-d agents when they face price Pd = 1, i.e., kD(d) = dd(1). 
Given demand elasticities (ed) and observable data, it is straightforward to recover 
kD(d) from equation (18). That is, kD(d) = Dd ´ dedP , where Dd and Pd denote grain 
consumed and price faced by type-d consumers, respectively, during the period used for 
calibration. But Dd = md ´ D, where md º Dd/D represents the market share of type-d 
consumers and D º å
d d
D  is total grain consumption during the calibration period. 
Hence, kD(d) may be estimated from equation (19), as well: 
 kD(d) = md ´ D ´ dedP . (19) 
Expression (19) is employed here to calculate kD(d) because market shares are easier 
to interpret than are absolute quantities. More importantly, equation (19) facilitates 
performing sensitivity analysis when market shares md are not well known. This is true 
because market shares must satisfy the properties of a probability distribution, i.e., md ³ 0 
and å
d d
m  = 1. Therefore, a simple accuracy check consists of verifying that any 
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postulated set of market shares satisfies such properties. Further, equation (19) allows us 
to resort to alternative parameterizations of well-known families of probability density 
functions to conduct sensitivity analysis regarding md. 
Supply functions (11) are also postulated to be isoelastic, i.e., ss(Ps) = kS(s) sesP , 
where kS(s) represents a supply scaling function and es is the constant supply elasticity 
corresponding to type-s producers. Supply scaling function kS(s) may be recovered 
analogously to equation (19). That is, kS(s) = ms ´ S ´ ses
-P , where ms º Ss/S denotes 
the market share of type-s producers, Ss is aggregate production by type-s firms, S º 
å
s s
S  represents total grain production, and Ps is the price faced by type-s producers, all 
corresponding to the period used for calibration. 
 
Short-Run Results and Discussion 
In the short run, market prices will depend on the available supplies of GM and non-
GM grain and on consumer preferences. Consumer preferences can be described based 
on the discounts (d) at which they are indifferent about GM and non-GM grain and the 
market share associated with each consumer type (md). 
Available data on consumer preferences categorize consumers into broad homoge-
nous groups. For example, livestock feeders consume the bulk of the corn output, and all 
of these consumers are currently viewed as being indifferent about the two types of grain 
(i.e., d = 1). Companies that purchase corn for food and for export markets prefer non-
GM grain, and these markets have a discount for GM corn. The corn-processing industry 
is also a major consumer and it, too, is viewed as being homogenous with a preference 
for non-GM grain, due to the desire to sell corn gluten to the EU. Finally, there is a small 
group of consumers who, for ethical or philosophical reasons, refuses to consume GM 
grain at any price (i.e., d ® 0). 
In reality, slight differences in preferences are likely to exist within the broad groups 
of consumers. For example, some livestock feeders may in fact be concerned about 
market access for livestock producers, and this subset of producers will have d < 1. These 
preference differences within the broad groups would be missed if we used only the 
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available data on market shares and deltas. To address this issue, a beta cumulative 
distribution function (cdf) is fitted to the existing aggregate data as shown in Figure 5.9 
The thick line shows the delta values for each broad group on the horizontal axis and the 
cumulative market shares on the vertical axis.10 Next, the parameters of a beta cdf that 
fitted approximately through the center points of the group-specific market shares are 
obtained. The curve labeled high-d Beta(×) in Figure 5 shows this beta cdf for the corn 
market data taken from the 1999 crop year. For example, this beta cdf shows that 18.5 
percent of the consumers had a discount factor of d £ 0.9. The use of this continuous cdf 
allows us to approximate the preference differences within the groups and gets around the 
lumpiness introduced by the industry data. 
It is relatively easy to introduce a change in consumer preferences using the beta cdf. 
The curve labeled low-d Beta(×) shows how preferences might respond if additional 
controversy arose about GM foods. For example, in the spring of 2000, a GM variety of 
corn called Starlink was approved in the United States  for animal use but not for food 
use. This variety was allowed into the U.S. bulk handling system after the fall 2000 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Distribution of consumer types 
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harvest and created controversy when it was found in certain food products such as taco 
shells and corn chips. Consumer scares of this type will influence different market 
segments in different ways. In this situation, the GM discount of those who consume corn 
as food might increase appreciably, while the GM discount of the processing sector might 
remain constant. As shown in Figure 5, the beta cdf is flexible enough to allow for 
different relative effects of this type.11 
Market Impacts 
Figure 6 shows the impact on market prices of changes in the available supply of 
GM and non-GM grain. The data in the figure are based on the consumer preferences 
depicted by the curve high-d Beta(×) above. The horizontal axis measures the percentage 
of the short-run supply that consists of GM grain. For example, a value of 0.9 on this axis 
means that 90 percent of the grain supply is GM and that 10 percent is non-GM. Note that 
these percentages need not be related to the proportions of GM and non-GM crops 
planted. This is true because farmers and grain storers will typically co-mingle GM and 
non-GM grain unless there is an incentive not to do so. In addition, GM crops can 
potentially pollinate non-GM crops, again reducing available non-GM supplies. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Prices of genetically modified and non-genetically modified grain, 
assuming high-d Beta(×) cdf 
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The data in Figure 6 assume a $0.20/bu cost associated with handling a differentiated 
grain. This cost is approximate and is based on Miranowski et al. 1999. Costs include 
those associated with inefficient use of elevator space, additional paperwork arising from 
certification, and small-batch transportation. This cost corresponds to a 10 percent price 
differential in the normalized prices. Whenever consumers are willing to pay these 
additional handling fees, non-GM grain is made available at a premium that equals these 
additional handling costs. This drives a wedge between the non-GM price paid by 
consumers and the non-GM price received by farmers. 
With the high-d Beta(×) consumer preferences used in Figure 6, the farm-level prices 
of GM and non-GM grains are identical so long as the short-run supply share of GM 
grain does not exceed 80 percent. These results might seem surprising given that most 
consumers prefer non-GM grain (see the high-d Beta(×) curve in Figure 5). The reason for 
this result is that consumers must be willing to pay a premium that exceeds handling 
charges before impacts will be seen in farm-level prices. For example, if the available 
supplies of GM grain equal 70 percent, then those consumers who are willing to pay a 
premium for non-GM grain will do so and non-GM grain will be treated as a niche 
market. At the farm level, some non-GM grain will enter this niche market and some will 
enter the bulk market. Farmers who segregate non-GM grain for this niche market will 
receive a premium that compensates them for additional handling charges but will 
otherwise receive that same price for GM and non-GM grain. This scenario represents the 
actual market structure observed in the 1999 crop year. 
A different market structure emerges when the supplies of non-GM grain become 
very tight. This is shown in the results to the right of the 80 percent point in Figure 6. 
Here, the non-GM grain supplies are so low that there is not enough to supply those 
consumers who are willing to pay a premium that equals or exceeds handling charges. 
Some of the consumers in this group will need to be enticed into buying GM grain, and 
this can only occur if GM grain is discounted at the farm level. For example, if the 
available supply of GM grain is 90 percent, then market equilibrium occurs where non-
GM grain sells at a premium of 15.1 percent (= 1.089/0.946) (see Figure 6). Given a 15.1 
percent discount, these consumers are now willing to consume a GM commodity grain in 
lieu of the more expensive alternative. Because this equilibrium discount exceeds the 10 
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percent handling charge, a discount must also emerge at the farm level. All GM grain 
must sell at the same discounted price at the farm level, because there is no way to charge 
different prices based on end uses in a bulk commodity system. 
The situation just described is not representative of a typical niche market because 
the underlying bulk commodity market is also affected.12 Those farmers who initially 
own the 90 percent market share of GM grain will try to sell it at a non-discounted price. 
But for markets to clear, consumers who have 0.869 (= 1/1.151) £ d £ 0.9 must 
eventually be induced to purchase this GM grain. Thus, GM grain will be bought and 
sold until all GM grain sells at a discounted price and markets clear. 
Figure 7 repeats the analysis shown in Figure 6 but with a different representation of 
consumer preferences. The consumer preferences modeled in Figure 7 are from the low-d 
Beta(×) cdf depicted in Figure 5. In Figure 7, available supplies of GM grain need only 
exceed 50 percent of the market for the farm-level differential between GM and non-GM 
prices to occur. This farm-level discount grows rapidly and exceeds 10 percent of the GM 
price when the supply share of GM grain exceeds 89 percent. Farmers who own non-GM 
grain get a premium in excess of identification costs. Those who own GM grain need to 
 
FIGURE 7. Prices of genetically modified and non-genetically modified grain, 
assuming low-d Beta(×) cdf 
Response to an Asymmetric Demand for Attributes / 19 
 
discount their product in order to sell to the marginal (high d) consumer. These farmers 
would be unwilling to plant GM grain in the following year unless the cost advantage of 
GM exceeded the farm-level discount schedule. 
 
Long-Run Results and Discussion: The Impact of Introducing 
Genetic Modification Technology 
The short-term results presented above are driven by consumer preferences, because 
supply is held fixed. In the long-run results discussed here, supply is allowed to adjust to  
the introduction of GM technologies. Therefore, the nature of the technology innovation 
on the supply side needs to be described. In the baseline scenario, GM technologies are 
not available, so only non-GM grain is produced. 
The introduction of GM technologies reduces the per bushel production cost, and this 
cost reduction varies across producers, as shown in Figure 8. The discrete cdf represents 
our best assessment of the production cost differences across broad producer groups for 
the 2000 crop year and are based in part on data from Duffy and Smith (2000) and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS 2000).  
 
 
FIGURE 8. Distribution of producer types 
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The variation in cost reduction across producers is motivated by differences in soil 
types, weed infestations, insect pressure, and the ability to absorb information about new 
technologies. Two supply scenarios are considered. The curve labeled high-s Beta(×) is 
the beta cdf fitted to the broad-group data. The high-s Beta(×) curve shows that no farmer 
achieves more than a 25 percent cost reduction from GM grain. About 5 percent of 
producers obtain more than a 20 percent cost reduction, and about 20 percent of 
producers get more than a 15 percent cost reduction. The low-s Beta(×) curve shows a 
greater incentive to adopt, with almost 40 percent of producers getting a cost reduction of 
15 percent or greater. Both curves show a significant group of producers who obtain very 
little cost reduction from the GM technology. 
Table 1 presents results for 20 different scenarios, chosen to reflect various market 
conditions. These scenarios include the following: much consumer concern (low d) and 
little consumer concern (high d); a small cost reduction (high s) and a large cost 
reduction (low s); with supply elasticities at the high end and the low end of those 
reported in the literature (0.6 and 0.3, respectively); with demand elasticities of –0.3 and 
–0.6; and with identification costs of 10 percent and 20 percent of the baseline market 
price, which is calibrated to equal 1. Because baseline quantity is also calibrated to equal 
1, baseline total expenditures (which equal total revenues) equal 1 as well. 
Scenario 1 represents a situation with a lot of consumer concern and a large 
production cost advantage for GM grain. Elasticities in this scenario are small, implying 
that both supply and demand are relatively unresponsive. The identity cost in scenario 1 
is 10 percent of the baseline market price. Reading across the first row of numbers in 
Table 1, the results for this scenario show that GM grain captures an 81 percent market 
share. At 1.0074, total grain production (GM plus non-GM) is slightly higher (0.74 
percent) than in the baseline. The GM price is 11.6 percent lower than the baseline price 
of non-GM grain, reflecting lower production costs. The non-GM farm price is also lower 
than in the baseline, reflecting increased competition from inexpensive GM grain as well 
as the need for non-GM producers to bear some of the costs associated with identity 
preservation. The non-GM wholesale price is higher relative to the baseline. This is true 
because non-GM consumers must pay a portion of the identification cost and because
  
TABLE 1.  Long-run effects from introducing genetic modification technology 
 Ident. Elasticity  Market Sharea  Equil. Supply  GM Non-GM Price  Surplus Change    
Scen. Cost Sup. Dem. Sup. Dem. GM Total Price Farm Wholesale Prod. Cons. d* Indiff.b s* 
1 0.1 0.3 -0.3 Low s Low d 0.8147 1.0074 0.8841 0.9435 1.0435 0.0278 0.0231 0.847 0.884 0.937 
2 0.1 0.3 -0.6 Low s Low d 0.8176 1.0099 0.8917 0.9514 1.0514 0.0371 0.0149 0.848 0.892 0.937 
3 0.2 0.3 -0.6 Low s Low d 0.9396 1.0076 0.8882 0.9179 1.1179 0.0292 0.0102 0.794 0.888 0.968 
4 0.1 0.6 -0.3 Low s Low d 0.8202 1.0100 0.8763 0.9355 1.0355 0.0197 0.0315 0.846 0.876 0.937 
5 0.1 0.6 -0.6 Low s Low d 0.8252 1.0152 0.8838 0.9434 1.0434 0.0286 0.0238 0.847 0.884 0.937 
6 0.1 0.3 -0.3 Low s High d 0.9127 1.0134 0.9047 0.9436 1.0436 0.0489 0.0426 0.867 0.905 0.959 
7 0.1 0.3 -0.6 Low s High d 0.9172 1.0180 0.9185 0.9578 1.0578 0.0655 0.0281 0.868 0.918 0.959 
8 0.2 0.3 -0.6 Low s High d 0.9865 1.0168 0.9163 0.9346 1.1346 0.0616 0.0258 0.808 0.916 0.980 
9 0.1 0.6 -0.3 Low s High d 0.9196 1.0180 0.8909 0.9293 1.0293 0.0338 0.0573 0.866 0.891 0.959 
10 0.1 0.6 -0.6 Low s High d 0.9281 1.0273 0.9044 0.9434 1.0434 0.0499 0.0435 0.867 0.904 0.959 
11 0.1 0.3 -0.3 High s Low d 0.7117 1.0006 0.9102 0.9441 1.0441 0.0042 0.0013 0.872 0.910 0.964 
12 0.1 0.3 -0.6 High s Low d 0.7140 1.0009 0.9111 0.9448 1.0448 0.0055 0.0003 0.872 0.911 0.964 
13 0.2 0.3 -0.6 High s Low d 0.8995 0.9973 0.9052 0.9134 1.1134 -0.0061 -0.0065 0.813 0.905 0.991 
14 0.1 0.6 -0.3 High s Low d 0.7142 1.0010 0.9090 0.9434 1.0434 0.0036 0.0024 0.871 0.909 0.964 
15 0.1 0.6 -0.6 High s Low d 0.7167 1.0015 0.9100 0.9440 1.0440 0.0046 0.0017 0.872 0.910 0.964 
16 0.1 0.3 -0.3 High s High d 0.8532 1.0059 0.9304 0.9454 1.0454 0.0222 0.0186 0.890 0.930 0.984 
17 0.1 0.3 -0.6 High s High d 0.8557 1.0079 0.9367 0.9516 1.0516 0.0295 0.0119 0.891 0.937 0.984 
18 0.2 0.3 -0.6 High s High d 0.9964 1.0063 0.9329 0.9356 1.1356 0.0241 0.0086 0.822 0.933 0.997 
19 0.1 0.6 -0.3 High s High d 0.8569 1.0080 0.9239 0.9390 1.0390 0.0157 0.0254 0.889 0.924 0.984 
20 0.1 0.6 -0.6 High s High d 0.8615 1.0121 0.9302 0.9452 1.0452 0.0227 0.0191 0.890 0.930 0.984 
Notes: The baseline scenario assumes that GM grains cannot be produced and is calibrated so that equilibrium supply and equilibrium non-GM prices (both at the 
farm and at the wholesale levels) equal 1. The table reports the effect of introducing GM crops with cost savings represented by the low- and high-s market shares. 
a The low- and high-s (d) scenarios are represented by the Beta(x| 2.5,1.7,0.68,1) and Beta(x| 1.4,0.8,0.77,1) [Beta(x| 20,2.3,0,1) and  
Beta(x| 16,1,0,1)] cdfs, respectively. 
b “Indifference” is the d of consumers (s of producers) whose welfare is unchanged by the introduction of the GM technology. Consumers with d > (<) “Indifference” 
experience a welfare gain (loss). Similarly, producers with s < (>) “Indifference” experience a welfare gain (loss).  
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non-GM grain prices must remain high relative to GM grain to induce producers to plant 
non-GM grain. 
All scenarios exhibit an increase in the wholesale price of non-GM grain relative to 
the baseline. This price increase suggests that some consumers will be worse off after the 
introduction of this technology. However, total producer and consumer surplus (shown in 
columns 12 and 13 of Table 1) increase. These measures of surplus are relative to 
baseline expenditures (and revenues) of 1. In scenario 1, the gain in consumer surplus is 
2.31 percent of baseline expenditures and the gain in total producer surplus equals 2.78 
percent of baseline revenues. The column labeled d* (s*) shows the discount level for the 
agent who is indifferent about consuming (producing) GM and non-GM corn under the 
market prices associated with this scenario. Discount level d* (s*) reflects the percentage 
difference between the GM price and the wholesale (farm-level) non-GM price. 
As mentioned previously, some consumers will experience an increase in welfare 
and others will experience a reduction in welfare. The d of the consumer who is 
indifferent about the introduction of the GM technology is reported in the “indifference” 
column of Table 1. This consumer will have the same level of surplus after introducing 
GMs as in the (pre-GM) baseline. All consumers with d less than this critical value will 
be worse off after the introduction of GM technology. These consumers have a relatively 
strong preference for non-GM grain. Those who dislike GM grain the most (i.e., those 
with d < d*) will continue to consume non-GM grain after the introduction of the GM 
crops, whereas those who are not as adamantly against GM grain (i.e., those with d* £ d < 
“indifference”) will switch to consume GM grain. In scenario 1 with a GM price of 
0.884, consumers in this second subgroup (0.847 < d < 0.884) would have consumed 
non-GM grain if its price had stayed at 1 after introducing GM technology. However, the 
non-GM price increase (from 1 to 1.0435) caused by the latter induced such consumers to 
switch and buy GM grain. 
Note that the d level of the consumer who is indifferent between a particular scenario 
and the baseline is exactly equal to the GM price for that scenario. This makes sense. For 
example, in scenario 1, consumers can get GM grain at an 11.6 percent discount with 
respect to the non-GM price in the baseline scenario. Hence, consumers with d = 0.884 
Response to an Asymmetric Demand for Atributes: An Application to the Market / 23 
 
 
are neither worse off nor better off after the introduction. Consumers with d > 0.884 will 
gain, because they would have bought GM at prices higher than 0.884 if GM had been 
available in the baseline. In scenario 1, such consumers can buy GM grain at a lower 
price than they had been willing to pay in the baseline. 
For producers, the simulations can be interpreted as a “technology innovation” 
respective to the baseline, which allows firms to produce at lower cost but such that cost 
savings differ across firms. Producers with the greatest cost reductions benefit and 
producers with the smallest cost reduction are worse off. In scenario 1, producers who 
can achieve cost savings from GM production of more than 11.6 percent (i.e., s < 
“indifference”) gain because their costs fall by more than the price of GM grain. Those 
producers whose costs fall by less than 11.6 percent (i.e., s > “indifference”) lose 
because the market price of grain falls. Producers with s = “indifference” are indifferent 
about producing non-GM at a price of 1 (i.e., the baseline price) and producing GM at a 
price of 0.884. 
The last column in the table shows s*, the s of the producer who is indifferent about 
producing GM and non-GM grain under the market prices shown for each scenario. Note 
that all producers with s < s* (= 0.937) plant GM, but only those with s < “indifference” 
(= 0.884) benefit compared to the baseline. For example, in scenario 1, a producer with    
s = s* = 0.937 is indifferent about producing GM and non-GM. However, since the non-
GM farm price is 0.9435, it is obvious that this producer is worse off now than in the 
baseline when the non-GM price was 1. 
Scenarios 11 through 15 all have a relatively large amount of consumer concern and 
a relatively small production cost advantage. In these scenarios, the changes in producer 
and consumer surplus are very small, and in scenario 13 they are negative. What happens 
in scenario 13 is that most farmers switch over to GM grain production (GM output share 
is 90 percent) and thus bulk handling facilities are used for GM grain. A significant group 
of consumers continues to purchase non-GM grain, and to do so they must pay high costs 
(assumed equal to 20 percent) associated with identity preservation. These identity 
preservation costs did not exist in the baseline, and in this particular scenario the 
additional costs associated with this second system are greater than the production cost 
advantages associated with the GM technology. The results for this scenario seem 
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counterintuitive in that a group of individually rational agents has adopted a technology 
that collectively makes them worse off. This kind of result suggests that it is worthwhile 
to look more closely at the individual welfare effects for this particular scenario. 
For scenario 13, the GM price is 0.9052 of the non-GM baseline price. Those 
producers who have a production cost advantage of more than 9.5 percent benefit from 
the GM technology. This is 40 percent of producers, as shown in Figure 8. However, a 
significant group (60 percent) of producers does not experience this critical reduction in 
production costs. Because identification costs are high in scenario 13, the farm price of 
non-GM grain is also low at 0.9134. Producers with s > 0.905 must therefore accept a 
major reduction in output price, and the welfare loss for this group (3.27 percent of total 
baseline revenues) is greater than the welfare gain for those producers who did 
experience a large cost reduction (2.67 percent of the total baseline revenues). 
Many of those consumers who do switch to GM grain in scenario 13 do so because 
the price of GM grain is almost 19 percent lower than the wholesale price of non-GM 
grain. However, many of these consumers have a weak preference for non-GM grain and 
so they do not obtain the full benefit associated with the reduction in GM prices. A 
significant group of consumers continues to consume non-GM grain despite the large 
price differential. Consumers who at a GM price of 0.9052 would have preferred to buy 
non-GM grain if its price had stayed at the baseline level of 1 (i.e., consumers with d < 
0.905) suffer a welfare loss of 2.78 percent of total baseline expenditures. Consumers 
who would have bought GM grain if it had been offered to them in the baseline at a price 
of 0.905 or higher experience a welfare gain equal to 2.13 percent of total baseline 
expenditures. Because the losses of the former outweigh the gains of the latter, 
consumers as a whole experience a loss from the introduction of GM grains. In scenario 
13, the identification cost acts like a tax or distortion, and the negative effects of this 
distortion are felt by producers who receive lower prices and by consumers who either 
pay the tax or consume a GM product despite a weak preference for non-GM grain. 
 
Conclusions 
Grain marketing and handling facilities have evolved to minimize handling and 
production costs and are not set up to offer consumers a choice among various product 
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lines. This system has evolved because in the past, few consumers were willing to pay the 
premiums associated with a differentiated system. Those consumers who have been willing 
to pay for differentiated grains have participated in small, high-cost niche markets. 
The development and commercialization of GM grains has created some unusual and 
difficult problems for those involved in the bulk commodity markets. At first, very few 
consumers expressed any concern about the technology. This lack of concern coupled with 
a strong incentive for farmers to adopt allowed GM grain to capture most of the market. 
With this majority market share has come access to the bulk handling system that had 
formerly been utilized for non-GM grains. Soon after GM grains became the standard in 
U.S. markets, a significant amount of consumer concern emerged. This concern is greatest 
in food and export markets but has been expressed also by grain processors who export by-
products to the EU. The market share of these concerned groups is less than 50 percent. 
This paper develops a framework for examining the price and welfare effects of 
these developments. Results are presented for the short run where supplies are fixed and 
for the long run when supply is allowed to adapt to market conditions. 
The short-term results show that in most cases, non-GM grain becomes another niche 
product. However, there are some reasonable parameterizations that show a more 
profound market effect. This situation can occur when the proportion of consumers who 
are willing to pay a premium in excess of handling costs for non-GM grain is greater than 
the share of non-GM grain available. In years when these circumstances exist, the farm 
price of all GM grain will be discounted so that some GM grain is purchased by 
consumers who prefer non-GM grain. In years when these circumstances do not exist, 
farm prices of GM and non-GM grain will be identical because the marginal consumer 
will be indifferent between the two types of grain. 
The long-run results show that in almost all circumstances, consumer and producer 
welfare is greater after the introduction of GM technology. However, in all instances 
some consumers and some producers will lose. Consumers with a strong preference for 
non-GM grain will lose because they must pay farmers a premium to encourage them to 
grow non-GM grain and pay the handling charges associated with identity preservation. 
Farmers who do not obtain a substantial cost reduction from producing GM grain will 
also lose because market prices will reflect the cost savings available to those who obtain 
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a greater cost advantage. There are circumstances where both producer welfare and 
consumer welfare are lower after introducing GM technology. This can occur when 
identity preservation is expensive and cost savings are relatively small. Interestingly, this 
outcome is obtained even though all agents are individually rational.
  
 
Endnotes 
1.  The postulated demand (1) is consistent with modern consumer behavior theory (Becker 1971; 
Lancaster 1971), which treats goods as inputs that are used with time and human capital to produce 
commodities that directly enter a consumer’s utility function. For example, the postulated demand 
schedules are consistent with utility-maximizing agents who derive utility from consumption of non-
GM grain but derive no utility from consumption of GM grain. However, type-d agents can transform 
GM grain into non-GM grain at a cost of (1/d - 1) PGM per unit. This transformation can only be 
performed for self-consumption purposes (i.e., its produce cannot be marketed) (see, e.g., Chap. 10 in 
Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). Because the net cost of transforming one unit of GM grain into one unit 
of non-GM grain is 1/d PGM, agents of type d will either buy non-GM grain directly if 
D
noP  < 1/d PGM; 
buy GM grain and transform it if DnoP  > 1/d PGM; or be indifferent as to the two ways of getting non-
GM grain if DnoP  = 1/d PGM. 
2. Expressions (4) and (5) should involve integrals instead of summations if d types follow a continuous 
distribution. 
3. The inequality condition on d* follows from the relationship PGM £ 
S
noP  = 
D
noP  - C. Suppliers would be 
irrational if this condition were violated, since PGM > 
S
noP  means that suppliers sell non-GM grain as 
identified non-GM grain for SnoP  dollars, instead of selling it as unidentified GM grain for PGM (>
S
noP ) 
dollars. 
4. This implies that if only non-GM grain were available, each of the two types of consumers would 
consume half of the total supply of (non-GM) grain. 
5.  This assertion applies only to consumers with d = 1. In general, the consumer surplus of type-d agents 
(0 £ d £ 1) is measured by the area under the total demand schedule dd(Pd). 
6. Note that the model is quite general because costs are measured based on per bushel of grain produced, 
not on a per acre basis. For example, the model includes the cases where GM grain can be produced at 
lower per bushel cost because of either higher GM yields per acre than non-GM crops, given the same 
production costs per acre, or lower GM production costs per acre, but the same yields per acre as non-
GM crops. 
7. This assumption implies that both types of firms are identical at producing non-GM grain, because P1 
= Ps = 
S
noP  for sufficiently low PGM, in which case S1no = S1 = Ss = Ssno. As discussed later, however, 
actual output may be different for the two types of firms because P1 need not be equal to Ps in general. 
8. As mentioned in connection with equations (4) and (5), equations (14) and (15) should involve 
integrals rather than summations if firms’ distributions are continuous rather than discrete. 
  
9. The beta cdf is given by Beta(x| a, b, xmin, xmax) º G(a + b) (x - xmin)
a-1 (xmax - x)
b-1/[G(a) G(b) (xmax - 
xmin)
a+b-1] for xmin £ x £ xmax, where G(×) is the gamma function. 
10. The model assumes four types of corn consumers. The first type is strongly opposed to GM food for 
religious, philosophical, or food safety reasons and has d = 0.1. This group consumes 1 percent of the 
annual production. Some members of this group are located in the U.S. and some are located outside of 
the U.S. A second group consists of firms that produce ethanol and high-fructose corn syrup, and the 
by-product corn gluten feed. This group has a market share of 12 percent. Firms in this group have an 
economic incentive to avoid GM grains if there is a discount for gluten from GM grain. This discount 
will emerge if the EU bans imports of GM animal feeds. This discount can be estimated by comparing 
the value of gluten feed for delivery to the EU with the value of the same product retained for feeding 
in the U.S. This discount will vary depending on the relative prices of feed grains in the U.S. and the 
EU and the proportion of total production that is exported. If the EU bans importation of GM animal 
feeds, processors sell gluten on U.S. rather than on EU markets. Gluten for delivery to the EU sells at 
$100/ton, whereas GM gluten for domestic consumption sells at the 1999 price of $50/ton (USDA-
ERS, Feed Outlook, various). Each bushel of corn processed yields 13.2 pounds of gluten, and a 
reduction in the gluten price of $0.025/lb ($50/tn) corresponds to a discount of $0.33/bu, or 16.5 
percent, assuming that corn is worth $2.00/bu. Hence, the second group is assumed to have d = 0.84. 
The third group consists of firms that process food for domestic consumers not identified in the first 
two groups and those who purchase grain for export. These firms know that some of their consumers 
will have a preference for non-GM food, and they find it easier to switch all of their production over to 
non-GM crops rather than to maintain two separate production systems. Exports accounted for 21 
percent of production in 1999 and food for domestic consumption accounted for 7.9 percent (FAPRI 
2000). However, since some of those consuming food belong to the first category above, the market 
share of this second group is set at 28 percent. This group is assumed to have d = 0.9. The fourth and 
last group consists of those who feed corn to domestic livestock in the U.S., which is assumed to have 
d = 1 and takes the remainder market share (i.e., 59 percent). 
11. Of course, other cdfs may be needed to realistically represent other scenarios. 
12. Under these market conditions, three prices are relevant. These are the wholesale price of non-GM 
grain, the farm price of non-GM grain, and the farm price of GM grain. Under the niche market 
structure we have described above, only two prices are relevant, the wholesale non-GM price and the 
farm price of all grain. 
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